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Abstract
We model the choice of individuals to follow or not apprenticeship training and
their subsequent career. We use German administrative data, which records edu-
cation, labour market transitions and wages to estimate a dynamic discrete choice
model of training choice, employment and wage growth. The model allows for
returns to experience and tenure, match speci¯c e®ects, job mobility and search
frictions. We show how apprenticeship training a®ects labour market careers and
we quantify its bene¯ts, relative to the overall costs. We then use our model to show
how two welfare reforms change life-cycle decisions and human capital accumula-
tion: One is the introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit in Germany, and the
other is a reform to Unemployment Insurance. In both reforms we ¯nd very signi¯-
cant impacts of the policy on training choices and on the value of realized matches,
demonstrating the importance of considering such longer term implications.
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11 Introduction
Germany operates an apprenticeship system which consists of formal vocational training
courses combined with on-the-job training that lead to certi¯cation of skills. Such ap-
prenticeship systems relate both to white collar and blue collar jobs and are subsidized by
the state, which funds the classroom component. In contrast, other countries, including
the U.S., have no such widespread organized formal system.
Throughout the 1990s, several countries, including the U.S., the U.K., France, and
Norway, have attempted to expand or implement new ¯rm-based apprenticeship schemes.1
Now there is renewed interest in promoting apprenticeships at least in the UK, with the
government committed to spending $1.14 billion just in 2009-10 to fund training in an
expanding apprenticeship sector.2 With such policies gaining in popularity, the question
is how are the career and wages of a worker a®ected by participation in a formal ap-
prenticeship and how does it compare to a career with less structured training that one
obtains when one starts work following the end of schooling at 16.
To address this question we have at our disposal detailed and accurate administrative
data. This allows us to track the careers and wages of individuals from when they make
their educational choice and enter the labour market in all German states and for many
di®erent cohorts. This is an important advantage of our data over other sources such
as the NLSY, which follow one single cohort. Individuals are thus observed deciding
between an apprenticeship or a job under quite di®erent local labour market conditions,
providing exogenous variation driving this choice. In the descriptive part of the paper
we demonstrate that conditional on aggregate time e®ects and permanent regional ef-
fects, there are signi¯cant di®erential changes over time and across regions in educational
choices. We use this information to estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of careers
and wages, with labour market frictions and to understand better the relative merits of
the two di®erent paths. The high quality of the data is an important strength of our
approach: all transitions and wages are recorded accurately by the ¯rms avoiding recall
1see Bowers, Sonnet, and Bardone (1999), and Dustmann and Schoenberg (2008), for an extensive
discussion of the German and the UK system and HouseofLords (2007) for some of the debate in the
UK.
2The Daily Telegraph 19 February 2009
2bias.
Careers following an apprenticeship may di®er from informal acquisition of skills in
a number of ways. First they may increase wages and the return to experience, because
of the specialized training they o®er. Second they may a®ect job opportunities through
various channels: on the one hand those with an apprenticeship quali¯cation may be
considered more desirable because they are better trained in a particular area, which
could a®ect both job retention and job ¯nding. On the other hand there is a question
on how the speci¯city of training can a®ect job reallocation following loss of employment
and what this might imply about the ability of an economy to adjust to reallocation
shocks (see Heckman (1993)). Thus job arrival rates, layo® rates and the heterogeneity
of job opportunities may all di®er across the two career paths.
In the model individuals at 16 face the choice of formal apprenticeship or the standard
labor market. When working, their wages grow with experience and job speci¯c tenure
and depend on a match speci¯c component; thus workers can move to new jobs so as to
improve the quality of their job match, subject to receiving an o®er. The match speci¯c
e®ect is subject to permanent shocks, which can lead to quits and job mobility. Wages are
speci¯c to sector3 and are subject to aggregate shocks that a®ect relative wages between
the sectors. Underlying choices is a °ow utility function that is linear in income and
depends on work status.
The model has the key features of an extended Roy model where individuals choose
sector by comparing gains and allowing for direct costs of apprenticeship and builds on
existing models of education choice4 and wage determination;5 it can be viewed as a
dynamic extension of Willis and Rosen (1979). We build on some of the key papers on
the dynamics of employment and wages. These include Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) who
model transitions between employment and unemployment jointly with wages, Wolpin
(1992) who estimates a search model of wages and employment and Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) who estimate a model of schooling, occupational
3We distinguish between quali¯ed apprentices versus those without such a quali¯cation, i.e. non-
apprentices. These groups constitute our two sectors.
4See Taber (2001), Card (2001), Cameron and Heckman (1998).
5See Heckman and Sedlacec (1985), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), Topel and Ward
(1992), Altonji and Williams (1998), Altonji and Williams (2005), Dustmann and Meghir (2005).
3choice, labour supply and wages. We bring together many elements of this earlier work,
building a model of vocational training, wages, employment and job mobility within a
search and matching framework; our model has a rich stochastic structure for wages and
allows both for endogenous quits and job destruction as well as search frictions.6 Our
framework, provides us with a way of assessing the value of apprenticeship and to trace
the key elements that constitute the di®erence in the two careers.
The results show that apprenticeships lead to di®erent wage pro¯les with more growth
upfront and none following 10 years of experience, while wages in the non-apprenticeship
sector grow at a lower rate but for longer. Overall wages are higher with apprenticeship.
Non-apprentices have much higher job destruction rates but also higher job arrival rates,
making them easier to reallocate, following shocks; this relates directly to the question
of how the apprenticeship system a®ects °exibility in an economy.
In the ¯nal part of the paper we analyze how career choice and human capital accu-
mulation interact with welfare reform. We focus on the e®ects of introducing tax credits,
such as the US EITC, and of making the amount of unemployment insurance ¯xed and
not related to past earnings. The ¯rst reform is motivated by the fact that it is in fact
debated as a policy option in Germany7 and is a popular programme in the US and the
UK. The second is motivated by the fact that such a reform took place in the UK in
the 1980s under the government of Margaret Thatcher. Setting the policy analysis in a
lifecycle framework is important for understanding the e®ects of policy as well as from a
normative perspective of designing tax and welfare systems. Similar dynamic e®ects of
policy have been discussed and quanti¯ed in Keane and Wolpin (2000) who simulate the
lifecycle e®ects of a wage subsidy, including on education choice and Heckman, Lochner,
and Cossa (2003) who consider the impact of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), on
human capital accumulation. We show that the reforms we consider can have substantial
e®ects on education choices, job mobility and wages. An important limitation of our
simulations is that they are partial equilibrium and take the pay structure, as re°ected
6Sullivan (2006) estimates an interesting model of educational and occupational choice, labour market
transitions and wages using the NLSY. The speci¯cation of his model, nature of the data and empirical
focus di®er substantively from ours.
7See Sinn, Holzner, Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2002) 2006.
4in the distribution of o®ers as given; this is an important avenue for further research.8
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
model. Section 3 discusses the identi¯cation strategy. Then Section 4 presents the data
set and descriptive statistics. In Section 5 we display the estimation results. Finally,
Section 6 evaluates the e®ect of in-work bene¯ts and of reforming the UI system.
2 Model
The model is set in discrete time and focuses on the population that chose the vocational
education track at 10 and are completing this form of secondary at 16 years of age; at that
point they must choose either to follow an apprenticeship or to enter the labor market as
a non-apprentice. In what follows we use the term apprentices or quali¯ed apprentices
for those who followed the apprenticeship system and non-apprentices for the rest. To be
able to capture the richness of the data without making the model intractable we chose
the time period to be a quarter.9
At the start individuals choose whether they will join an apprenticeship, which o®ers
formal on the job and classroom training at a reduced wage, or no formal training. In
taking this decision they trade-o® working at an unskilled labor market wage with working
at a lower wage as an apprentice and then obtaining an improved career path through the
formal training. We assume that both an unskilled job and an apprenticeship position
are available immediately. Utility is linear in earnings making risk and the timing of
consumption irrelevant for decision making.
Once the education choice has been made the individual starts up on his career,
whether as an apprentice followed by normal work once quali¯ed or directly into a stan-
dard job without an apprenticeship component. All individuals receive job o®ers with
some probability, which may di®er depending on whether the worker is employed or not.
During apprenticeship, individuals may move to a new employer but not to unemploy-
ment. When out of work the individual derives utility which is a function of the wage
8Papers which have included General Equilibrium analysis within the context of dynamic models
of heterogeneous agents estimated from Micro data include Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Lee
(2005), Lee and Wolpin (2006).
9An individual is deemed to be employed in a quarter if the largest part of the three months was
spent working. Otherwise they are non-workers.
5earned in the last job. Jobs can end either because of a quit or because of exogenous
job destruction. Individual choices include moving between jobs when the opportunity
arises and between work and unemployment as well as the initial education choice.
Aggregate shocks We characterize the macroeconomic °uctuations of the economy
around the steady-state growth trend by detrended GDP. The macro shock is relevant
because it potentially a®ects the relative price of the two skill groups as well as the
relative attractiveness of being out of work.10 The macro state variable Gt is modelled as
a discrete two state Markov process of order 1. The aggregate trend and the transition
probabilities are presented in the Appendix in Table 13. We now describe the model
formally and then discuss estimation.
2.1 Payo® °ows
Wages and the utility of working. The central component of the model is the job
contract. If a worker i and a ¯rm f match at time t, the output is split according to
some unspeci¯ed rule that yields an annual wage wift to the worker. In addition, a job
provides a one o® unobserved value ¹if to the worker, which can be interpreted as an
amenity value of the new ¯rm or a cost of switching to that ¯rm (it can be positive or
negative). This allows for the possibility that workers may move to a job that pays lower
wages, as is observed in the data.11 Workers are assumed risk neutral, which also implies
that liquidity constraints are not an issue of concern for this model.
One simple way to think about the wage-setting mechanism is Nash bargaining.
Worker i and ¯rm f negotiate a wage given match output and job amenities. If the
worker happens to meet another ¯rm e f while employed, she compares the two bargaining
solutions and takes the best o®er. Wage contracts are continuously updated following
10An issue of concern here is the appropriate notion of a business cycle. Under full factor price
equalization with the trading partners the European business cycle would perhaps be more relevant.
Here we assume that the German business cycle is su±ciently correlated with the European one to
capture the relevant aggregate shocks in°uencing relative human capital prices.
11Given we cannot observe the wage left behind when moving jobs (as we do not observe the shock to
the match speci¯c e®ect) it is possible to rationalize moving to ¯rms that appear to have lower wages by
a large negative shock in the previous job, without having to resort to moving costs. However, this turns
out to be a restrictive speci¯cation that does not ¯t the data well because of the normality assumption.
Thus allowing for this moving cost/amenity adds °exibility to the model and e®ectively relaxes the
distributional assumption.
6shocks to match productivity, and, as in a standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
model, really bad productivity shocks may result in unemployment.12
Wages are speci¯cally modelled as follows. Let Edi 2 fA;NAg denote the worker's
apprenticeship quali¯cation status (A for apprentices and NA for non-apprentices). Let
Xit be the number of quarters spent in work (including the apprenticeship period) since
age 16.13 Let Tift denote the number of years spent in the current job (Tift = 0 if the
job in ¯rm f starts in period t). Let also "i be a permanent individual characteristic
that is unobserved by the econometrician but is known by the worker and observed by
the employer. Quarterly earnings wift are functions of the macroeconomic shock Gt,
education (Edi), experience Xit, tenure Tift, the unobserved permanent heterogeneity
variable "i, and a match-speci¯c component ·ift:
lnwift ´ lnw(Edi;Gt;Xit;Tift;·ift;"i) = ®0("i) + ®Ed("i)Edi
+®X(Xit;Edi) + ®T(Tift;Edi) + ®G(Edi)Gt + ·ift
(1)
where ®X and ®T are two education-speci¯c functions of experience and tenure. We use
a piecewise linear function, with nodes at 0, 2, 4, 6 and 30 years of experience and tenure.
Unobserved heterogeneity a®ects the overall level of log wages and the wage return to
apprenticeship.14 Unobserved heterogeneity allows the wage level and the return to
apprenticeship to be heterogeneous in the population, as implied by numerous empirical
studies.








which captures the heterogeneity in wages when individuals start a new job. We interpret
this as match speci¯c heterogeneity and we allow it to di®er by apprenticship status
12We discuss brie°y the German institutional framework below. Here it su±ces to say that within
it there is enough °exibility to describe wage setting in this way because Collective bargaining, for the
¯rms where it applies, only sets minimum wages. Of course even in a context which is more regulated
than this, the ¯rms and workers can get round these regulations by rede¯ning jobs and promotions.
13Xi;t+1 = Xit + 1 if the worker is working in period t; otherwise, Xi;t+1 = Xit. We do not allow for
depreciation of skills while unemployed.
14In earlier versions of the paper we allowed the returns to experience and tenure to also vary with the
unobserved factor ". However, this did not yield interesting results and we restricted the wage equation
to the one presented in 1.
7allowing us to estimate the extent to which job opportunities vary in each of the two
sectors. Then, whenever Tit ¸ 1,




This allows for the possibility that the value of a match and the contracted wage can
change, while allowing for persistence over time. Contrary to the US and the UK, the
cross sectional variance of wages does not increase over the lifecycle (¯gure 13), which
means that a random walk of wages that continued across jobs would lead to counter-
factual implications and would be inappropriate. This led us to the above speci¯cation,
where the random walk component is reinitialized when changing jobs, leading to wages
that are stationary over the life-cycle, because jobs have a ¯nite expected life.
Employed workers value the current wage w(Edi;Gt;Xit;Tift;·ift;"i) with a linear





We also allow for a one o® cost of quitting a job and becoming unemployed. This
transition cost is denoted by ¹U ´ ¹U(Edi) and is a deterministic function of education.
Its role is discussed in the empirical section.
The utility of being out of work. While unemployed, the individual derives a utility
from unemployment bene¯ts calculated as a fraction of the last wage when employed
(denoted wi(¡1)), as in the German unemployment insurance UI system. When UI is
exhausted after about 18 months an unemployed worker moves on to the means-tested
unemployment assistance. Given the length of time for eligibility and the generosity of
social assistance for lower wage individuals such as ours, we have made the simplifying
assumption that the replacement rate is always 55%.15 In addition, there is a utility of
leisure which varies across individuals on the basis of education, experience, unobserved
15In Appendix A we describe the details of the German UI system. Here we have taken a replacement
rate that is on average correct for our population. Modelling the entire system would imply an increased
state space.
8heterogeneity "i and a Gaussian white noise ´it with variance ¾2
´. Thus, the instantaneous
utility of unemployment is:
RU
it ´ RU(Edi;Xit;wi(¡1);´it) = °Uwi(¡1) + °X(Xit;Edi) + ´it;
´it » iidN(0;¾2
´(Edi));
with °U = 0:55 and °X(Xit;Edi) is an education-speci¯c, piecewise constant function of
experience (with nodes at 0, 2, 4, 6 and 30 years of experience).
Finally, we assume that all shocks f·0
if; uift; ¹if; ´itg are jointly as well as serially
independent, and independent of the unobserved heterogeneity variable "i (see below for
a complete description of unobserved heterogeneity).
2.2 The intertemporal value functions
Individual decisions to work, to move to a new job or to quit working are carried out
by comparing the lifetime values of each of these states. We now describe how they are
de¯ned.
The value of unemployment. At the end of period t, unemployed individuals draw
a job o®er with probability ¼U
it ´ ¼U(Gt;Edi;Xit) function of the aggregate shock, edu-
cation and experience. They can choose to take this job, depending on how the value of
working compares to the value of unemployment. The value of unemployment consists of
a predetermined part and a stochastic shock ´it re°ecting changes in the utility of being

































where we underline the variables over which we are taking expectations (because they
are unknown to the individual in period t) and where ¯ is the discount factor.
In 2 the ¯rst line of the right hand side (A) represents the within period value of being
out of work (up to the stochastic shock ´it). This consists of the unemployment insurance
9income plus a value for leisure. The lines denoted by (B) represent the expected future
value for the case where the worker gets a job o®er, which happens with probability ¼U
it.
In that case the worker will choose the best of taking the job o®er or continuing as an
unemployed worker. The value of taking the job o®er is equal to the sum of the present
value of the future °ow of earnings de¯ned below, W(¢), plus a (stochastic) amenity ¹if.
The ¯nal line (C) represents the case where the individual obtains no o®er and thus just
has to continue out of work.
The value of employment. Employed individuals may be laid o® with probability
±it ´ ±(Edi;Xit) and conditional on not being laid o®, they draw an alternative job o®er
with probability ¼W
it ´ ¼W(Gt;Edi). A number of young people (although not all) are
called up for military service. While the reason for leaving employment is not reported
in the data we capture the incidence of military service by allowing for a di®erent job
destruction rate when work experience is less than ¯ve years for those who did not follow
the apprenticeship route and between 2-5 years for those who quali¯ed (i.e. for the ¯rst
three years following their quali¯cation). Following this initial period ±(Edi;Xit) can be
interpreted as the standard job destruction rate.
Their value of employment is then given by
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The current value of work is just the wages wit: Following job destruction, which occurs
with probability ±it the individual will receive the value of unemployment as shown in line
B: The group of lines marked C represent the events when the job is not destroyed and
10the individual obtains an alternative job o®er. In this case they have to choose between
becoming unemployed, in which case they incur the exogenous one-o® cost ¹U(Edi);
remaining with the ¯rm; or taking the alternative o®er, which is associated with the one
o® random switching cost ¹ie f of joining a new ¯rm ~ f. The following group of lines marked
by D represent the expected value of a worker not being laid o® and not having access to
an alternative o®er. Given that a shock can occur to the match speci¯c e®ect, the worker
may decide it is best to quit, in which case they receive the value of unemployment.
Otherwise they receive the value of working with the same ¯rm, at the updated wage.
The value of employment while in training. Going back, earlier into the individ-
ual's history, we consider choices available when training. During apprenticeship (which
lasts ¿A periods16) we assume that the training ¯rm pays the worker only a fraction ¸A
of his productivity as a non-apprentice (w(Edi = NA;Gt;Xit;Tit;·it;"i)), the rest pre-
sumably serving as payment for the general training received.17 Re°ecting the facts in
the data, we do not allow the individual to experience unemployment during apprentice-
ship, although they can decide to change ¯rm if the opportunity arises. Thus, during the
apprenticeship training period (Xit < ¿A) the value of work is:
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where and where the expectation operator E relates, as before, to the underlined variables,
which are unknown to the individual in period t.
Similarly to the value of working described above, the ¯rst line (A) is earnings while
training, (B) represents the part of the value due to the possibility of changing training
¯rms if an o®er arrives (with probability ¼A). As before there is a mobility cost asso-
16Apprenticeship courses last between two and three years. We equate ¿A to whatever is the actual
duration in the data.
17In actual fact this is only part payment towards the general training: at least the classroom compo-
nent is funded by the government.
11ciated with the decision to join the alternative ¯rm e f. Finally, line (C) represents the
continuation value for the case where no alternative training ¯rm is available.
While in the last period of apprenticeship the value function becomes as in equa-
tion (3) with all options available. However in this case if the worker quali¯es and
remains in the ¯rm that trained him we observe a wage which is an average of the ap-
prenticeship and fully quali¯ed wage: the data only records compensation over the whole
calendar year and does not distinguish between pre-quali¯cation and quali¯cation status.
Thus, in e®ect neither wage is observed and must be integrated out.
The ex ante value of apprenticeship. The choice to follow an apprenticeship train-
ing is assumed to be a one o® decision made at age 16 by comparing the value of a career
under the two training alternatives allowing for both the direct costs of training and
foregone earnings. At 16, the value of starting to work is given by equation (3) evaluated
at Edi = NA (non-apprentice), and zero experience and tenure. The value of joining an
apprenticeship is given by the bene¯ts of apprenticeship expressed in equation (4) net of















where Ri denotes the region the individual lives when 16.
The last two terms represent costs. The ¯rst, ¸0(Ri;Gt;"i), is a direct cost term,
which we model as a function of region, business cycle and unobserved heterogeneity.
Variability in this term provides identi¯cation information and is discussed below in
section 3.1. The second term, !it, is a normally distributed iid cost shock revealed to












if; ¹if and ·0
if0; ¹if0 represent the match speci¯c characteristics and one o® tran-
sition costs in the initial jobs in the alternative careers. The cost shock !it induces a
probability for this choice, conditional on all the other shocks, from which it is inde-
pendent. These, including the match speci¯c e®ects in both alternatives and the non-
12pecuniary bene¯ts, need to be integrated out. we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in
the costs to capture the possibility that individuals may di®er in their ability to train; as
we will discuss below "i will contain two factors: one for labour market ability and one
for training.
The time horizon and the terminal condition We solve the model by iterating
on the Bellman equations backwards from retirement which occurs after 50 years in the
labour market. At retirement the value is assigned to zero: in a linear utility framework,
such as ours, this is equivalent to assuming that individuals ¯nance retirement through
their own savings out of their wages.18 Having a terminal point beyond our observation
window requires assumptions on the returns to experience and tenure. We have thus
imposed that the returns to experience and tenure are constant between 10 and 30 years of
experience, extrapolating from our data which stops at 20 years of experience.19 We then
assume that wage growth due to experience (and tenure) stops after 30 years of experience
(and tenure respectively). The gain from this tight speci¯cation is that we avoid having
to use a separately parameterized terminal value function. In general experience and age
are sources of nonstationarity, the latter because of the ¯nite life nature of the problem.
The match speci¯c random walk and tenure are not sources of nonstationarity because
the jobs have ¯nite (and relatively low) expected lifetime, although we still need to take
into account of an increasing variance within jobs. However it turns out that, given our
assumptions above and the fact that the oldest individual in the data is aged 35, the value
functions and the simulation results were not sensitive to age, below 35. We have thus
used the value function at age 35 for younger ages, simplifying the problem and reducing
the state space. More on the computation of the value functions is in the appendix.
2.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Wages and apprenticeship costs depend on unobserved heterogeneity summarized by "i.
In general it may be far too restrictive to allow just for one factor heterogeneity (see for
example Taber (2001)) . We thus assume that "i consists of two random variables which
18Note that the model uses gross wages, before any pension contributions.
19This turns out to be an annual rate of zero for apprentices and 1.8% for non-apprentices. The
returns to tenure turn out to be always zero.
13follow a bivariate discrete distribution, each with two points of support. One element
enters the cost of apprenticeship while the other enters the wage equation and a®ects
the constant and the returns to apprenticeship. The two elements may be positively or
negatively correlated or possibly not at all.20 Education choice depends on the costs of
education (observed or not) and on the expected wage gains. Hence this speci¯cation
allows both for selection on unobserved returns to education and for ability bias as
expressed in the labour literature.21
3 Identi¯cation and Estimation
We shall use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the model. In this section
we address some identi¯cation issues and we brie°y describe how to write the likelihood,
a complete derivation of the sample likelihood being provided in Appendix E.
3.1 The identi¯cation strategy
By modelling the entire sequence of choices, including the initial allocation to the voca-
tional track and the choice to follow an apprenticeship or not, we take account of their
endogeneity using the restrictions implied by economic theory and the structure of the
model. However the availability of many cohorts observed in all German states gives
us further identifying power. We are able to exploit the fact when each cohort in each
state comes to the point of making the apprenticeship choice, it is faced with a di®erent
economic environment because each region is sensitive to di®erent shocks depending on
its industrial composition. Local demand for apprenticeships thus varies di®erentially
in response to demand shocks a®ecting the cost of obtaining apprenticeship training: if
plenty of positions are available in the region of residence at 16, one can live at home and
only commute short distances to the training workplace. However, when the available
positions are few, one may have to travel longer distances and possibly live away from
home to obtain apprenticeship, incurring greater costs. In addition we need to assume
that the labour market is su±ciently integrated over the country that individuals not
20In practice we normalize one point of support to be zero and include a constant in the wage of each
sector and in the costs of apprenticeship.
21See for example Griliches (1971), Card (2001), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2006) among many others.
14Birth Cohorts
1960 1965 1970
Academic Track 20% 21% 24%
Apprentices 64% 67% 65%
Non Apprentices 16% 12% 11%
Table 1: Proportion in di®erent education tracks by Year of birth
involved in training search over a broad enough area so that the local shocks do not
a®ect local wages.
To allow for these considerations we specify the direct costs of apprenticeship as
functions of region of residence at the time of apprenticeship (Ri), the business cycle
as well as an unobserved component "i.22 The initial region of residence is taken as
exogenous. We exclude region and region interacted with the business cycle from wages
and preferences for work.23 The availability of 12 cohorts of data for the German states
provides ample di®erential variability in the initial exogenous conditions to be able to
identify the model by in e®ect comparing the careers of individuals who entered the labor
market at di®erent point in time and in di®erent regions.
3.2 Initial conditions
The population whose labour market behavior we model consists of all individuals who
at 10 years of age are allocated to the vocational school track, rather than the academic
one. This choice is likely to depend on individual unobserved characteristics as well as the
economic environment at the time and involves both parental choice and the educational
authorities. As shown in Table 1, there is a steady (but small) decline in the proportion
following the vocational track over time (apprentices and non-apprentices in the table).
To resolve this initial conditions problem we specify a reduced form probability of
choosing the vocational versus the academic track P S
i as a function of the region and
year of birth of the individual (re°ecting the economic conditions at the time) as well
22More generically, we could have used an output price index by region as the factor driving costs.
We approximate this by using the business cycle indicator interacted with region.
23Identi¯cation relies on the exclusion of time/region interactions only, not region itself. So we have
imposed more restrictions than absolutely necessary. Technically, we could go further and include region
e®ects on wages, to allow for permanent compensating di®erentials across regions. However this would
make the model much harder to estimate because it would multiply the size of the state space by 10fold.
It would also raise the further problem of regional choice.
15as of the two factors of unobserved heterogeneity in the vector "i. We then specify the
joint likelihood of selection into the vocational track together with all the subsequent
choices and realized wages for those who followed the vocational track; the likelihood for
those who did not is just the reduced form probability of this event. All probabilities
and densities depend on "i. In practice this means that for all those who followed the
vocational track and are thus in our sample, the likelihood contribution, discussed in the
next subsection, is multiplied by P S
i ; for those not in the vocational track the likelihood
contribution is 1¡P s
i . Unobserved heterogeneity, which then needs to be integrated out,
accounts for the dependence of the initial education choice and the subsequent education
and career path.
The key assumption in this approach is that the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity is independent of region and cohort.
3.3 The likelihood function
The likelihood function is derived in Appendix E and the computation of the value
function is discussed in Appendix E.1. Here we o®er a brief outline. The likelihood
contribution of an individual conditional on the unobservable characteristics "i is the
joint probability of all observed events and of observed wage growth within the ¯rm
(density) as well as the observed initial wage at the start of the job. The discrete events
include the initial selection into the vocational track, the choice of apprenticeship or not,
moving in or out of work, remaining unemployed and remaining in the same ¯rm or
moving ¯rm.
To construct the probability of the events involves solving the model conditional on
permanent exogenous characteristics, including "i and all other state variables. These
include the number of periods the individual has worked (experience), tenure in the
current ¯rm, the past wage (for unemployment insurance), region, the position of the
business cycle, the current value of match speci¯c e®ect and unobserved heterogeneity.
We ¯x the discount factor to 0.95 annually.
Once the model is solved a number of unobservables need to be integrated out of each
probability, which we do either analytically, where possible, or by using Gaussian quadra-
16ture. Once the probabilities have been computed we need to integrate out unobserved
heterogeneity from the product of all probabilities to obtain the joint unconditional prob-
ability of all observed events for one individual. Finally, the sample likelihood is assumed
to be the product of these unconditional probabilities.
To maximize the likelihood function we use a combination of Simplex and Gauss-
Newton optimization algorithms. Most of the computational time for estimation is used
up in computing the probabilities that constitute the likelihood function. We estimate
standard errors using the outer product of the scores of the log-likelihood function.
4 The Data Set
We draw a sample from a data set organized by the German IAB24 and which in its
totality consists of a 2% extract from the German social security records. The data
set starts in 1975 and records all work spells with exact start and end dates up to
1996. The data records spells of apprenticeship training and whether a worker holds
an apprenticeship quali¯cation or not as well as their overall educational quali¯cations.
Once an individual is in the data set they are always followed. We concentrate on those
for whom we can observe the start of the labor market career so as to avoid any initial
conditions problem. This means that the oldest person in our data is 35. Moreover,
to avoid the initial conditions problem we need to model the initial education choice
at age 10. But we can only infer who has made this choice once we see individuals in
the labor market; then we see their educational quali¯cations and we can allocate them
accordingly. Individuals who follow the academic track typically enter the labor market
later. Hence to be sure we observe the entire cohort, whatever education choice they
made, we must only use those cohorts who are old enough to be observed at age 25 years
of age or older. Given our observation window this means that our population are those
men born in the period 1960-1972. The length of period includes su±cient changes in
the aggregate environment of each German state to provide the required variation for
identifying education choice.
The data set reports the average daily pre-tax wage each year if the individual stays
24Institut fÄ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (Institute for Employment Research).
17with a ¯rm for an entire year. For individuals who move jobs we observe as many wages
as ¯rms they worked in during the year. Thus wages are not averaged across di®erent
¯rms. In the model we use wages that have been detrended using a quadratic trend
common across the two groups as described in the appendix and in Table 12
The data is far too detailed and would be intractable to model in all ¯ne details.
We thus time-aggregate the data to obtain information on a quarterly basis. Whenever
during a quarter an employment and an unemployment spell are both present we assign
to one of these depending on which of the two covers the largest proportion of that
quarter.
Our main sample and focus of study consists of West-German males, who end formal
education at 15/16 and who either work or join an apprenticeship after school. However,
individuals who are not in this group are kept so as to model the initial choice at 10
to follow or not the vocational track. The overall data set is too large, given the time
it takes to compute the likelihood. We thus use a random subsample drawn from the
total population of cohorts born in the period 1960-72. This subsample contains 3371
individuals in the vocational track. These are followed through time, quarter after quarter
up until 1996. To re-iterate, our data has some key advantages for the type of work we
carry out: All transitions are recorded accurately from administrative records and so are
wages from the start of the labor market career, and through the period of apprenticeship
training, if applicable.25
4.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Data
Wage Pro¯le and Labor Market Transitions. Figure 1 displays the log wage pro-
¯le as a function of years of labor market experience for those with an apprenticeship
quali¯cation (\skilled"), for those currently training as apprentices (\wage in appren-
ticeship") and for the non-apprentices (\unskilled") as well as the di®erence between the
apprentices and non-apprentices (right hand axis). Non-apprentices have a rapid increase
in their wage during the ¯rst ¯ve years on the labor market. Over the next ¯fteen years,
the wage growth is just below 25%, resulting in a 1.2% real average growth per year. Dur-
25The Social security data is in principle top coded. However, this does not a®ect individuals in our
sample, whose pay is noth high enough.
18ing apprenticeship training workers are paid a very low wage, thus presumably covering
the cost of their apprenticeship with the remaining output they produce during on-the-
job training.26 At the end of the apprenticeship training, wages increase and overtake
those of non-apprentices. From there on, the wages of those with an apprenticeship qual-
i¯cation increase slightly faster. After ¯fteen to eighteen years, the di®erence in wages
between skilled and unskilled is about ten percent. From this graph it almost seems
puzzling that anyone wishes to follow an apprenticeship career, given the large up-front
investment in training that lasts about 3 years and the apparently low rate of return in
terms of wages. Of course comparative advantage and other di®erences between the two
career paths may well explain the large participation rates in apprenticeships and it is
one of the questions we investigate.
Wages are only one dimension in which education groups may di®er. Another im-
portant dimension is labor market attachment. Table 2 displays the quarterly transition
probabilities by education and time in the labor market. Unskilled workers have a higher
probability of dropping out of work. During the ¯rst ¯ve years on the labor market, each
quarter, about six percent of employed skilled workers exit, while this ¯gure is about 14%
for the unskilled. The proportion decreases when we look at more senior workers, but
the education di®erence still persists. The probability of job to job transitions is higher
at the beginning for non-apprentices and after ¯ve years declines for both groups and
becomes marginally higher for the quali¯ed apprentices.
Quali¯ed apprentices with 5-10 years of potential experience have a higher probability
of return to work from unemployment, by about 3 percentage points. This reinforces the
e®ect on unemployment of the higher exit probability for the unskilled. Thus, in total,
the unskilled spend less time working; over 20 years they work a total of 13.4 years,
compared with a total of 15.3 years for skilled workers.
Figure 2 displays the number of ¯rms in which an individual has worked in as a
function of time since entry on the labor market. The di®erence comes from the early
years, where workers during their apprenticeship, are much less mobile. However they
26Heckman (1993) sees the low apprenticeship wage as a means of bypassing minimum wages mandated
by the unions. Given the length of apprenticeship training and the often narrow set of skills they o®er
this is not an unreasonable interpretation.
19Non-Apprentices Apprentices
Potential Experience (Years) 0-5 5-10 10-20 0-5 5-10 10-20
Out of work to Out of work .84 .89 .93 .83 .86 .9
Out of Work to Work .16 .11 .071 .17 .14 .070
Work to out of Work .14 .073 .046 .063 .051 .023
Work to new Work .045 .034 .022 .035 .038 .024
Work to same Work .82 .89 .93 .91 .91 .95
Table 2: Observed Quarterly Labor Market Transitions
never catch up following quali¯cation. The mobility numbers are much lower than those
in the U.S. as documented in Topel and Ward (1992) amongst others.
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Decomposing Wage Growth. Wage growth occurs both within ¯rm and as a result
of ¯rm mobility. Job shopping, can be a very important source of wage growth as
documented in Topel and Ward (1992) and can be crucial in achieving e±cient matches
(see Heckman (1993)).
In Germany, despite lower mobility rates, this is also the case. This is illustrated in
Figure 4 which shows within ¯rm wage growth by potential experience and skill level and
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in Figure 3, which displays the growth of wages following a job to job transition. The
wage growth in the latter case can be substantial, at nearly 40% for non-apprentices and
for quali¯ed apprentices (post training). The gain in wages falls over time, decreasing
towards zero. If we think of wage improvements as being due to better matches, as
in our model, the decline is expected because the probability of an improvement will
decline as the worker climbs up the job-quality ladder. Within ¯rm wage growth for
the non-apprentices is very high early on in the career re°ecting the rapid learning that
takes place on the job. The equivalent training for the apprentices takes place during
the o±cial training period. Clearly job mobility is an important source of wage growth.
Carrying out a simple decomposition exercise, for the unskilled 25% of growth of wages
over 20 years is accounted for by job mobility. For those following an apprenticeship
career the ¯gure is 15% for wage growth that follows the training period. Whether this
di®erence means that matching is more important for lower skill individuals or simply
that quali¯ed apprentices are less mobile and are missing out on opportunities can not
be ascertained from this.
Finally, a few words on the institutional framework: Germany operates a collective
bargaining system at the industry level. Agreed wages within this system act as minimum
21wages and ¯rms may and do pay wages above the union wage; there is no restriction on
paying workers more according to merit (productivity). Union agreements are binding
in ¯rms that belong to an employer federation (Arbeitgeberverband ), which constitute
about 62% of employers and 83% of the workforce. Thus we can think of the German
labour market as one where a negotiated minimum wage operates for many ¯rms, with
no upwards restrictions and where there is a competitive fringe with no restrictions at all.
The presence of minimum wages will be re°ected in our model in increased proportions
out of work.27
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Vocational Training and Wages. Given the exogenous variation determining ap-
prenticeship, as described earlier in section 3.1, we can follow an instrumental variables
approach to estimate the e®ect of apprenticeship on wages, ignoring here selection e®ects
due to participation. This is done mainly as a descriptive device and to illustrate what
would be obtained using the IV approach.
To check the ¯rst stage, we run a probit for apprenticeship choice including time
e®ects, region e®ects and their interactions. The latter have a p-value of zero establishing
27For more details on the German institutional system see Dustmann and Schoenberg (2009)
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that indeed there is su±cient di®erential variation of apprenticeship participation, which
we attribute to changing availability of positions and costs.
We then use the interactions between region and cohort as the excluded instruments
in a log wage equation to estimate the e®ect of an apprenticeship.28 In particular we
estimate the following regression:









where PX represents potential experience and b eit is the residual from the linear reduced
form regression of apprenticeship on region and time e®ects and their interactions. This
control function approach for controlling for the endogeneity of apprenticeship choice
(Ed) is identical to IV in linear models and is useful here where we have four di®erent
education terms. The regression is similar to a di®erence in di®erences approach with
many time periods and regions.29
This regression is estimated for all those who have at least four years of potential
experience, which ensures that the trainees will have completed apprenticeship. We
28The estimates represent Local Average Treatment e®ects if the underlying parameters are heteroge-
neous. See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
29(see for example Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998))
23compare the results to those obtained by OLS (i.e. excluding the residual) in Figure 5.
The horizontal axis is potential experience after formal schooling ended at 16. The p-
value on ° is an exogeneity test for Ed, and in this occasion it is about 3%, rejecting
exogeneity. The results show an IV return which is higher than OLS both of which
increase with age. Noting that an apprenticeship lasts between two and three years and
it only involves part time schooling, the rest of the time being work, these returns are of
the same order of magnitude as the returns to education.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 The Fit of the Model
We evaluate the ¯t of the model by simulating the education decisions, the labor market
transitions and the wages for a cohort of individuals over time and comparing to the
actual data. The model ¯ts remarkably well and we refer the reader to Appendix D where
the results are shown in some detail in Table 14 for the labor market transitions and in
Figures 10, 11 and 12 for experience and tenure pro¯les, the number of di®erent jobs held
and wages respectively. These graphs also serve as data description for these key aspects
24of labor market careers. In Figure 13 we also show the ¯t of the standard deviation of
wages over the life-cycle. This is interesting for the di®erent pattern it displays to the
one known for the U.S. (see Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2006)) where the variance is
increasing over the lifecycle. In Germany this declines after a rapid increase for the young
and then remains constant. This justi¯es our speci¯cation for the stochastic structure
of wages, where the match speci¯c shocks are not carried over to the new jobs, making
them e®ectively transitory. Indeed, our model, while not ¯tting perfectly the standard
deviation is very successful in capturing the broad pattern.
5.2 The Parameter Estimates
Transition probabilities and costs. Table 3 presents some key parameters that de-
termine the careers of individuals. Exogenous quarterly destruction rates, i.e. excluding
quits, are 0.02 and 0.03 a quarter for the two groups in Germany for workers who have
worked over 6 years.30 For the less experienced workers the job exogenous destruction
rates are higher, but this partly re°ects departures for military service, that are not
explicitly observed, but occur in the early part of one's career.
The job arrival rates are allowed to vary by business cycle; we ¯nd that the arrival
rate for unemployed non-apprentices is quite cyclical and in all cases it is much higher
than the one for the skilled apprentices. In other words reallocating skilled apprentices
seems to be much harder than for non-apprentices, indicating in°exibility possibly due
to relatively narrow training they receive. When employed, the non-apprentices also
receive many more alternative job o®ers. For the non-apprentices the arrival rate is quite
pro-cyclical.
Thus among the German workers the non-apprentices loose their jobs more frequently
but seem to have more job market opportunities when unemployed. All this suggests that
apprentices have very stable employment, but that when this is lost they have greater
di±cult ¯nding a new position: apprenticeship training may reduce mobility and may
thus restrict the ability of the economy to accommodate reallocation shocks.
In the lower part of Table 3 we report the parameters driving the (stochastic) mobility
30We do not want to compare the destruction rates for the less experienced because they involve
departures for military service.
25Parameter In Appren- Quali¯ed Non-
ticeship Apprentices Apprentices
Job O®ers and Job Destruction Rates
Quarterly job destruction rate (±)
if experience · 4 years - 0.106 0.16
(0.0029) (0.0059)
if experience 2 [4,6] years - 0.059 0.089
(0.0016) (0.0036)
if experience > 6 years - 0.022 0.031
(0.00062) (0.0023)
Quarterly o®er arrival rate when employed (¼W)
if business cycle low 0.0149 0.116 0.228
(0.0012) (0.0037) (0.024)
if business cycle high 0.0188 0.12 0.313
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.033)
Quarterly o®er arrival rate when unemployed (¼U )
if business cycle low, experience=0 - 0.229 0.746
(0.0084) (0.054)
if business cycle high, experience=0 - 0.247 1
(0.009) (0.098)
if business cycle low, experience=10 - 0.358 1
(0.018) (0)
if business cycle high, experience=10 - 0.377 1
(0.018) (0.11)
Std dev of utility shocks to unemploymenta (¾´ ) - 1.1% 1.1%
(0.034) (0.034)
Mean of mobility cost to unemploymenta (¹´ ) -4.1 -3.81
(0.13) (0.26)
Mean of mobility costa (m¹) 1.1 1.1 -0.726
(0.11) (0.11) (0.2)
Std dev of mobility costa (¾¹) 2% 2% 2%
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Utility of leisurea (°0)
if experience · 4 years 0.84% 0.84% 0.71%
(0.015) (0.015) (0.048)
if experience > 4 years -0.37% -0.37% -0.25%
(0.021) (0.021) (0.074)
aPercent of lifetime value, which is 8206.49. Likelihood: -74986.1935. Asymptotic standard Errors in parentheses
Table 3: Estimated parameters: Variance of shocks, Job destruction and job arrival rates
and mobility costs
26bene¯ts or costs towards other jobs and to unemployment. For skilled individuals, the
mean non-wage bene¯t of moving (m¹) is 1.1% but is highly dispersed with a standard
deviation (¾¹) of 2%; Thus, on average, quali¯ed apprentices obtain a non-wage bene¯t
by moving equivalent to 1.1% of lifetime value and thus may be willing to move for a pay
cut. In contrast, the non-apprentices on average move for a pay rise only as they face a
large cost of moving of the order of 0.73% of life time value.
We have also allowed for a ¯xed cost of quitting work to unemployment. Without
the cost of transition to unemployment the composition of those becoming unemployed
was such that the average wage of employed individuals was predicted to be too high,
implying that the productivity composition of the unemployed was lower than it should
be. The need to allow for such a cost may re°ect risk aversion, where the risk of a long
unemployment spell would prevent low productivity individuals from quitting. It thus
turns out that the cost of quitting is 4.1% of lifetime value for the quali¯ed apprentices
and 3.8% for the non-apprentices. Once all is accounted for the realized quit rate accounts
for about 25% the °ow from work into unemployment. The parameter estimates imply
that over a 20 year period apprentices are expected to spend 25% of quarters out of work,
while non-apprentices 35%. In Appendix Table 14 we compare the ¯tted transitions to
those from the data.
Wage equation. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for the wage equation. The
two parameters that characterize the stochastic structure of wages are the standard
deviations of the innovation to the match speci¯c e®ect (¾u) and match heterogeneity
(¾0). For the quali¯ed apprentices the standard deviation of the innovation is 0.035, while
for the non-apprentices this is 0.038. Converting those to the variance of the growth
of average annual wages we would obtain standard deviations of approximately 0.060
and 0.066 respectively. During apprenticeship the standard deviation is much larger.
However, in money terms the °uctuations represent small changes because of the low
salaries.
Perhaps one of the most striking result here is the standard deviation of initial match
heterogeneity, which is estimated to be 0.28 for the quali¯ed apprentices and 0.42 for the
non-apprentices. This implies that the pay accompanying job o®ers can range §56% and
27§84% for the two groups respectively. Thus in Germany there is considerable hetero-
geneity in job matches and hence great opportunities for wage growth from job shopping.
Below the variances of the shocks we report the constant in the wage equations, the
e®ect of the business cycle, the returns to experience and tenure. At each experience node
(2,4,6,10,30 years) we report the accumulated wage growth by that level of experience.
In between the nodes wages are linear in experience.31 Similarly for tenure. For the
apprentices experience (and tenure) starts counting at the start of training and the ¯rst
two years (for some 3) are all spent in training: the estimated returns at two years thus
refer to the growth of wages by the end of training. The returns to experience thereafter
refer to the period following quali¯cation.
Apprenticeship choice is driven partly by the opportunity cost of apprenticeship.
The log di®erence in the wages between those starting apprenticeships and those staring
regular work without such training is 0.67 as can be seen by comparing the intercepts
of the non apprentices (3.55) and the apprentices during quali¯cation (2.88) in Table
4. As we shall see the high opportunity cost of training will be a central factor driving
the gains to apprenticeship. When training ends the wage equation intercept rises by
0.76 log points over and above the increased wage growth due to more rapid returns to
experience.
The returns to experience for the apprenticeship sector are substantial at the start
and °atten out by 10 years of experience. During the ¯rst two years wages for apprentices
grow by about 32%. The incremental e®ects of experience after two years is smaller at
4.5% a year for the next two years, declining to 3% and then to 1.7% and ¯nally to 0.1%
between 10 and 30 years of experience. For the non-apprentices the experience pro¯le
is less concave, with returns after 10 years of experience of about 1.8% annually. This
re°ects the more gradual learning experience in the standard jobs. The returns to tenure
are zero - speci¯c human capital is not re°ected in wages.
Finally, the German business cycle has a very small e®ect on relative wages for the
two groups. This is of the order of 0.8% between good and bad times for both groups
implying that the relative price of the human capital in the two groups is more or less
31Our data stops at 20 years of experience; beyond that we extrapolate linearly. The returns over this
period are driven by wage growth between 10 and 20 years of experience.
28Parameter In Appren- Quali¯ed Non-
ticeship Apprentices Apprentices
Std dev innovation to match speci¯c e®ect (¾u) 0.11 0.0354 0.0376
(0.00015) (4.2e-005) (0.00012)
Std dev of match speci¯c wage o®ers (¾0) 0.28 0.284 0.419
(0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0056)
Log Wage Constant 2.88 3.64 3.55
(0.0082) (0.0086) (0.015)
E®ect of high business cycle 0.008 0.00754
(0.00027) (0.00077)
Experience=2 yrs 0.32 0.1
(0.0065) (0.0078)
Experience=4 yrs 0.41 0.16
(0.0064) (0.013)
Experience=6 yrs 0.47 0.18
(0.0069) (0.015)
Experience=10 yrs 0.54 0.22
(0.0083) (0.022)
Experience=30 yrs 0.55 0.64
(0.028) (0.088)
Tenure=2 yrs 0.000 0.000
(0.0024) (0.0075)
Tenure=4 yrs 0.000 0.000
(0.0045) (0.01)
Tenure=6 yrs 0.017 0.000
(0.0066) (0.016)
Tenure=30 yrs 0.017 0.000
(0.029) (0.1)
Asymptotic standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 4: The Wage Equation and the shocks to wages
constant, which is consistent with the two inputs being perfect substitutes in production.
Job mobility and wage growth. In Figure 6 we plot the cumulative contribution of
job mobility to wage growth. This is obtained by simulating wage pro¯les disallowing any
direct job to job changes and comparing to the pro¯les we obtain with the full model.32
For those in apprenticeship job mobility contributes mainly when individuals move from
the training ¯rm to a new one leading to a small wage growth of about 4%. For the
non-apprentices, the \return" to mobility peaks at more than 10% with a slight decline
thereafter to 9%.33 Thus mobility is substantially more important for the non-apprentices
and, perhaps as expected, more important for the younger individuals.
32In the experiment, individuals still change jobs following unemployment spells
33See Topel and Ward (1992) for results in the US.
29Figure 6: The contribution of job mobility to wage growth



































Unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. The model allows for two fac-
tors of unobserved heterogeneity; one factor a®ects the level of wages and the return to
apprenticeship and another factor a®ects the costs of apprenticeship. Both factors enter
the probability of choosing the vocational rather than the academic track at 12 years of
age (the initial conditions equation). We use two points of support for each factor, which
implies the existence of four types of individuals. We estimate the proportion of these
types to be 18%, 14%, 64% and 3.9%. Table 5 displays summary characteristics for these
groups. Individuals of Type 1 and Type 2 have a low wage, whereas Type 3 and Type 4
high wages.34 Both Type 1 and 3 individuals have a lower cost of choosing apprentice-
ship equivalent to about 6% of life time value. Overall there is a positive association
between having a low cost of apprenticeship and having a high wage: among those with
low cost of apprenticeship (Types 1 and 3) the probability of being a high wage type is
78%; among individuals with a high cost of apprenticeship the probability is only 14%.
This is re°ected in the correlation between types of -0.46. Interestingly individuals with
a high wage type (3 and 4) have 3% lower wage return to apprenticeship (wage constant
34The points of support are reported over and above the constant in the relevant equations, which
explains why one is reported as zero.
300.31 versus 0.34). From the same table we see that there is a substantial e®ect of direct
or utility costs of apprenticeship on the proportion taking it up. The cost e®ect is lower
among low wage types. Moreover the e®ect of the wage type is positive among the low
cost individuals, but negative among the high cost ones. This demonstrates that for the
high cost types opportunity cost dominates their career choice.
In the ¯nal two rows of the table we report the coe±cients on the two unobserved
factors in the model for the selection into our sample. As a reminder for the reader, our
sample consists of those who at 10 were allocated to the vocational track of the German
school system. This is potentially an endogenously selected group with changing com-
position over time.35 We model this initial conditions problem by introducing a reduced
form probit selection equation, which depends on cohort£state e®ects and on the two
unobserved factors. We ¯nd that participation in our sample (vocational schooling after
10) is negatively associated with the cost of training (-0.613) but positively associated
with labor market ability (0.786). This is very much in line with a simple comparative
advantage story. However, the factor loading on the apprenticeship cost is not signi¯cant
(-0.613 with standard error 0.517), implying that the main source of sorting is the wage,
with higher wage people, opting for the vocational track, which also leads to less years
of education and faster entry into the labour market.
5.3 The Value of Apprenticeship
The natural approach to measuring the gains from apprenticeship is to consider the
lifetime value of following that career type viewed from the point where the ¯rst choice
is made; this takes into account all costs faced by the individual and all di®erences
associated with the two paths. Thus, the overall proportional gain from apprenticeship
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where the numerator is the discounted value of having an apprenticeship quali¯cation
as seen at the time of making the original career choice and is de¯ned in (5), while
the denominator is the equivalent value of not obtaining an apprenticeship. The gain is
35See Table 1.
31Parameter Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Proportion in sample (¼j) 0.18 0.14 0.64 0.039
(0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.21)
Proportion in Apprenticeship 0.91 0.78 0.88 0.71
Log wage constant Apprentices (®0(²)) 0 0 0.31 0.31
(0.0067) (0.0067)
Log wage constant Non Apprentices (®0(²)) 0 0 0.34 0.34
(0.016) (0.016)
Utility cost of apprenticeship as % of life time -6.1 0 -6.1 0
value (¸0(²))a (0.076) (0.076)
Factor loading for selection into 0 0 0.786 0.786
vocational track (wage heterogeneity) (0.017) (0.017)
Factor loading for selection into -0.613 0 -0.613 0
vocational track (cost of apprenticeship) (0.578) (0.578)
Correlation between types -0.46
a lifetime value used for scaling is : 8206.49. Asymptotic standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Unobserved Heterogeneity and the returns to experience and tenure
computed for each individual given the information set at the time the decision is made
and then we average over individuals. For this calculation we employ a horizon of 40
years. The results are displayed in Table 6.
Taking all individual costs into account, the average gain to apprenticeship (ATE) 36 is
11%. Netting out utility costs of apprenticeship, which turn out to be negative on average,
the gain declines to -4.1%. However, netting out the opportunity cost of education the
gain increases to 15%; in other words, if it was not for a preference for apprenticeship,
the opportunity cost is so high that on average the gains would not justify apprenticeship
training. Viewed from the point of view of age 18, after the apprentices have ¯nished
their formal training, the gains to apprenticeship are 5.5%. Here the di®erences between
the two groups relate to wages and labor market attachment, but they exclude the costs
of education as well as di®erence in job mobility during the training period. Finally, the
gains for those who choose to qualify as apprentices (ATT gains) are a substantial 13%.
The four last columns in Table 6 show the way the gains vary by type. Overall high wage
individuals have lower gains to apprenticeship and among them the gains are higher for
those with lower costs.
In the lower four rows of the table we consider the contribution to the gains of the var-
36ATE: Average Treatment E®ect; ATT: Average treatment on the treated.
32Average Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Wage Low High
Cost of Education Low High Low High
Average Treatment E®ect (ATE) 11% 8.4% 16% 4.3% 11%
Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 13% 13% 18% 8.9% 12%
ATE, at age 18 5.5% 8.2% 4.2%
Decomposing the gain to Apprenticeship
ATE, net of utility of education -4.1% -3.2% -3.1% -5% -4.5%
ATE, net of opportunity cost of 15% 12% 20% 8% 14%
education
Equal distribution of ¯rm-worker 23% 19% 27% 17% 24%
match (¾0)
Same job destruction rate 11% 8.1% 16% 3.9% 10%
No business cycle e®ects 13% 10% 18% 6.3% 13%
Same job o®er rate 22% 20% 28% 14% 21%
Table 6: The Life-cycle Returns to Apprenticeship
ious di®erences in the parameters of the model between apprentices and non-apprentices.
We do this by setting the relevant parameter for the apprentice group to that of the
non-apprentice. It is striking that giving the higher initial match-component variance
(¾0) to the apprentice group increases the gains to 23%. The variety of jobs available to
non-apprentices, is a large positive contributor to their labor market outcomes (through
job shopping) and hence to the overall low gain to apprenticeship. Also giving the ap-
prentices the same job o®er rates as the non-apprentices increases the gains to 22%.
Equalizing the job destruction rate has little e®ect, while eliminating the e®ects of the
business cycle increases the gains slightly.
Finally, note that these gains factor in all costs faced by the individual but not the
costs borne by the government or the ¯rm.
As a further illustration of the properties of the model we carry out two experiments:
in one we o®er half of all individuals randomly an education subsidy of 2% of lifetime
value; in the other the subsidy is increased to 20% and again randomly allocated. We
then use the generated data to estimate the Local Average Treatment E®ect of training
using the respective instruments. We compare this to OLS and to the e®ects obtained
when we randomly allocate training.37 All these approaches, including the one that
37On LATE see Imbens and Angrist (1994). In our model monotonicity is satis¯ed, i.e following the
subsidy all individuals either remain where they are or switch into training. This may not be true if one
allows for General Equilibrium e®ects.
33OLS Instrumental Variables (LATE)a Randomized Education
2% lifetime value 20% subsidy No Correction Selection correction
14.6% 31.7% 13.6% 12.6% 18.0%
aThe instrument is an education subsidy of 2% and 20% lifetime value respectively. The e®ect
of a 2% subsidy is 3% increase in education and the e®ect of 20% subsidy leads to a 10% increase
Table 7: Various estimators of the returns to training based on simulated data from the
model
randomizes education will be a®ected by composition e®ects due to non-random selection
into employment. To document how important this can be we also present the wage gain
based on randomizing education and corrected for selection bias into work. The gains
are estimated at age 24-28 and are presented in Table 7.
The OLS gains are about 15%. The IV that shifts a small marginal group into
training leads to a gain of 32%, while the IV which shifts a larger number of people
into apprenticeship (including many more people with lower gains) is 13.6. When we
randomize education the gain is 12.6%; correcting for selection however it grows to 18%,
demonstrating that it makes little sense to evaluate programme e®ects without correction
for selection into employment, even with "perfect" instruments.
6 Labor Market Reforms and Career Decisions
In this section we consider how welfare reform can a®ect career decisions and outcomes.
In doing this we follow Heckman and Klenow (1998) who emphasize that human capital
policies should be evaluated in a life cycle setting.38
We focus on two potential reforms: ¯rst we consider the e®ect of the introduction of
an Earned Income Tax Credit in Germany, a type of policy currently implemented in both
the U.S. and the UK and being debated for implementation in Germany.39 Heckman,
Lochner, and Cossa (2003) provide an analysis of the e®ects of EITC on human capital
accumulation, through its e®ect on choices for on-the-job training. They emphasize the
38Similar considerations are discussed in Keane and Wolpin (2000), who present the e®ect of a wage
subsidy on education and career choices.
39In our simulation the rates are set to match those of the U.S. EITC policy. There is a debate in
Germany to introduce programmes similar to the EITC. Perhaps the best known proposal is that of
Germany's IFO institute under the name "Aktivierende Sozialhilfe" or "Kombiloehne" (Sinn, Holzner,
Meister, Ochel, and Werding (2002) 2006). It proposes a permanent wage subsidy, to be paid to all low
quali¯ed workers, and is aimed at the low end of the earnings distribution.
34di®erence in e®ects depending on whether human capital accumulation is rivalrous to
work as in Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1964) or simply a by-product of work which
does not require a reduction in work time and hence earnings. Our model allows for
the latter form of non-rivalrous human capital accumulation when working; so from this
respect an EITC type programme will lead to increased human capital accumulation
because it encourages work. However, our model also allows for the possibility that
the decision to take up an apprenticeship scheme may change because the programme
compresses the returns to education for some individuals, but increases them for others.
Finally, the wage subsidy will change the incentives for job mobility, because it will reduce
the number of jobs that arrive with improved earnings and utility, after the programme
is taken into account.
The second policy we consider is the introduction of a °at unemployment bene¯t
instead of the current German system where the young lower paid unemployed are paid
about 55% of their last earnings. Such a reform was introduced in the UK in the 1980s.
All policies are simulated to be revenue neutral and proportional earnings taxation is
adjusted to achieve this. Both reforms are outlined in Table 8. The EITC subsidy we
have introduced is described in relation to the density of observed wages in Figure 7.
We also illustrate directly the e®ects of an unfunded tax cut to give an idea of how the
requirement of revenue neutrality is likely to a®ect the outcome of policies.
In interpreting our results we should note some limitations. Our model assumes risk
neutrality and as such ignores the insurance aspect of the policies introduced. Second,
our simulation takes as ¯xed the overall number of people allocated to the vocational
track at age 10. The change in policy may well a®ect the number and type of individuals
joining this group, but we do not take this into account. Finally, we do not allow for
general equilibrium e®ects, because we do not model how the pay policies of ¯rms will
change in response to the aggregate changes in supply of labour in the two sectors.
Before we present policy analysis that involves responses to complex changes we
present labor supply elasticities in Table 9 so as to provide a feel for the sensitivity of
labor supply to incentives.
The elasticities are the proportional change in participation resulting from a small
35Name Description
(1) EITC A wage subsidy at a rate of 40% up to 30
euros per day, stays constant up to 73.7 euros
per day and declines to zero at a rate of 21%
thereafter (see Figure 7) EITC is available
for those above 19 years of age only. It is
¯nanced by a proportional tax on earnings.
(2) Flat Unemployment Bene¯t 40% of "minimum wage" de¯ned as 18 eu-
ros per day. Excess revenue redistributed
through proportional taxation (subsidy) on
earnings.
Table 8: Simulated Policies
All workers Apprentices Non Apprentices
1.02 1.02 1.04
Table 9: Labour supply (participation) elasticities with respect to lifetime change in wage
proportional change in wages at all points in the lifecycle, keeping education choices con-
stant. Since our model is linear in income and the marginal utility of wealth is constant,
there is no obvious sense by which we can distinguish between Frisch and Marshalian
elasticities. Note that in our model increasing wages also increases unemployment bene-
¯t.40
6.1 Policy analysis
To derive the implications of the two suggested policies we ¯rst simulate the model under
baseline (no policy change) and then under each of the reforms for 10,000 individuals.
We then describe the impact of the reform on three key outcomes: education choice,
employment and quality of match.
Table 10 displays the e®ect on education choices by type of individual. Overall in work
bene¯ts reduce take up of apprenticeship by 1.8%. This is partly because the returns
to training are compressed by the subsidy:41 Given that low wage jobs are subsidized,
40In computing the elasticity we have kept unemployment income constant. However, allowing UI to
also change in line with the wage only changes the elasticities in the second signi¯cant ¯gure.
41Note that the subsidy is only available to those over 19, when apprenticeship training will have
¯nished; hence the policy is designed here not to act as a direct monetary disincentive to training.
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non-apprentices are clearly favored by this policy and this attracts more into the group
and out of apprenticeship training. The lowest panel implies that the increase in taxation
would tend to increase those obtaining skills because it reduces the opportunity cost of
education.
Employment increases for all types, but particularly for the low wage types, who are
much more likely to bene¯t from the reform. Indeed, judging from the e®ect of taxes,
the impact would have been much higher if it was not for the fact that taxes have to
increase to fund the programme. An additional channel by which policy has an impact is
by changing the incentives for job mobility. A job o®er consists of a new match speci¯c
e®ect and a mobility cost. Thus, an individual receiving EITC and being o®ered a job
with a better match value may not move because the improvements in utility, after
deducting the change in EITC bene¯ts and allowing for the switching costs, may be
negative. Moreover, under EITC individuals become less choosy about the jobs they
accept from unemployment. The result of this is that the quality of matches decline,
which translates to an overall decline of 1.9% in wages over the lifecycle.
Replacing the earnings related UI with a °at rate, which is independent of earnings,
as was done in the UK in the 1980s, has two opposite e®ects. On the one hand non-
37All Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Policy 1: Low Wage Subsidy (fully Funded)
% Increase Skilled -1.8% -1.7% -1.6% -1.9% -2.2%
% Increase in Work 4.2% 9.7% 9.7% 3% 1.6%
Di®erence in Match Speci¯c E®ect -1.9% -3.1% -2.3% -1.4% -1.6%
Change in Tax 5.4%
Policy 2: Flat Unemployment Bene¯ts (fully Funded)
% Increase Skilled -1.3% -1.3% -1.1% -1.4% -1.1%
% Increase in Work 11% 18% 18% 10% 8.2%
Di®erence in Match Speci¯c E®ect -5.2% -7.5% -6.5% -4.9% -4.4%
Change in Tax -13.1%
Policy 3: Tax Cut (unfunded)
% Increase Skilled -0.61% -0.75% 0% -0.69% -0.73%
% Increase in Work 3.5% 7.2% 6.8% 3.2% 1.8%
Di®erence in Match Speci¯c E®ect -0.47% -1.4% -1.2% -1.4% -0.0093%
Change in Tax -5%
Table 10: Policy E®ects on Apprenticeship training, employment and wages
apprentices, that have higher job destruction rates and are more sensitive to negative
wage shocks because their wage is lower, will ¯nd that unemployment is associated with
lower income. However, they also have higher job arrival rates. The net e®ect is a decrease
in those training for an apprenticeship by about 1.3% percentage points. Employment
increases by 11%, particularly for the lower wage types. Finally, because individuals
accept jobs much faster the average quality of the match decreases, reducing wages on
average by 5.2%. Figures 8 and 9 display the overall e®ect of the reforms on employment
and match quality respectively, over time.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have speci¯ed and estimated by maximum likelihood a model of appren-
ticeship choice, employment, job mobility and wages using detailed German administra-
tive records. This data has the rare characteristic that we can observe careers from the
start when individuals make their ¯rst decisions. There is no censoring or initial condi-
tions problem and measurement error is likely to be unimportant, because the records are
reported by ¯rms for the purpose of determining social security contributions. Moreover,
we observe many cohorts of individuals in all German States; this provides useful ex-
ogenous variation in the conditions under which the early education decisions are made,
38Figure 8: The Employment e®ects of EITC and UI reform (Apprentices)








































In the model individuals who have followed the vocational track of education choose
whether to follow an apprenticeship training or not. We then model the subsequent
labour supply and job mobility decisions jointly with wages, which are allowed to grow
with experience and tenure. The model allows for match speci¯c heterogeneity and search
frictions as well as permanent shocks to the match speci¯c e®ects and thus allows us to
understand the sources of wage growth. We are also able to estimate wage elasticities
of participation as well as the stochastic properties of wages and the extent of match
speci¯c heterogeneity.
Using the model we estimate the gain relating to apprenticeship; we show that the
opportunity cost of education is a major factor in the costs of training. Finally, we
quantify how welfare reform can change individual decisions over the lifecycle, a®ecting
human capital accumulation, employment and the quality of matches, demonstrating the
tradeo®s that policy makers need to face when introducing policies that are designed to
improve work incentives for lower productivity individuals.
39Figure 9: The e®ect of the EITC and UI reforms on the value of the match over the
lifecycle









































A The German Unemployment Insurance System
For the period we consider, the German unemployment compensation scheme distinguishes
between unemployment insurance bene¯t (Arbeitslosengeld AG) and unemployment assistance
(Arbeitslosenhilfe AH). To be eligible for AG, the employee must have contributed for at least
12 months over the preceding 3 years to the scheme. The scheme is ¯nanced by employer and
employee contributions in equal parts (amounting to 3.25 percent of the employee's salary).
There is a waiting period of 12 weeks if the separation was induced by the employee, but receipt
of AG starts immediately if the separation was caused by the employer. The compensation is
oriented on previous net earnings, and it amounts to 67 percent of the previous net wage (or 60
percent for employees without children). There is an upper threshold (for instance, 5200 DM
in 1984, and 6000 DM in 1990). AG can be received for up to 32 months, with the duration
of the entitlement period depending on age and the length of contributions to the scheme. If
an unemployed person ful¯lls the above criteria, the minimum period of eligibility is 156 days.
Depending on the duration of contribution payments and the age of the applicant, this period
40Constant E®ect of GDP
Region Coe±cienta Std. err Coe±cient Std. err
Schleswig-Holstein -10.8 ( 0.038 ) -0.1141 ( 0.0032 )
Hamburg -7.81 ( 0.04 ) -0.0002942 ( 0.0036 )
Niedersachsen -10.9 ( 0.55 ) -0.0005712 ( 0.002 )
Bremen -8.88 ( 0.0048 ) 0.4693 ( 0.0092 )
Nordrhein-Westfalen -8.21 ( 0.5 ) -0.1786 ( 0.0016 )
Hessen -10.1 ( 0.14 ) 0.1509 ( 0.0025 )
Rheinland-Pfalz -10.2 ( 0.052 ) 0.3878 ( 0.0031 )
Baden-Wuerttemberg -7.11 ( 0.61 ) 0.00154 ( 0.002 )
Bayern -12 ( 0.58 ) 0.0342 ( 0.0021 )
Saarland -11 ( 0.021 ) -0.187 ( 0.0061 )
Berlin -6.84 ( 0.0095 ) 0.347 ( 0.0056 )
Parameter Coe±cient Std. err
E®ect of GDP 0.1334 (0.11)
¾!
a 8.582 (0.19)
a All coe±cients are scaled as a percentage of \lifetime value": 8206.49
Table 11: Regional and Business Cycle e®ects on the costs to apprenticeship
can be extended to up to 832 days (see Kittner (1995), p. 192, for details.)
If AG is exhausted, or if the employee is not eligible for AG, he can claim AH. A condition
for receiving AH in case of non-eligibility for AG is having been in insured employment for at
least 150 days during the last year. Like AG, AH is based on previous earnings; it amounts
to 57 percent of previous net earnings (50 percent for employees without children). AH is
means tested, and its duration is unlimited. Both AG and AH are granted conditional on the
recipient's agreement to accept a reasonable employment (zumutbare BeschÄ aftigung).
B Some further parameter Estimates
This Table shows the e®ect of the business cycle and region on the cost of apprenticeship as
well as the standard deviation of the cost shock to apprenticeship.
C Wage trend, GDP growth and Markov transition
matrix
Wages are de°ated by the German CPI. We then detrend wages and GDP, the forme with a
quadratic trend and the latter by a a linear one. Since the changes in relative wages between




Table 12: Trend growth in wages
Below Trend in t+1 Above Trend in t+1
Below Trend in t 0.9302 (0.039) 0.069 (0.039)
Above Trend in t 0.075 (0.042) 0.925 (0.042)
Asymptotic standard Errors in brackets
Table 13: Quarterly transition matrix for below and above trend GDP
both. Over our modelling period (1975-1996) aggregate real wages grow very slowly as shown
in Table 12. In the model we use wages after detrending by these estimates.
We also detrend real per-capita GDP (constant 1995 US$) using a linear trend. GDP grew
at a rate of $479.18 (se 9.015) per year. In the model we then use transitions between above
trend (good times) and below trend (bad times) GDP growth on a quarterly basis based on the
estimated transition matrix in Table 13
D The Fit of the Model
Table 14 displays the labor market transitions by education groups at a quarterly frequency. We
distinguish ¯ve possible transitions, between unemployment (U), Employment E and between
same job and job to job. Overall, the model matches the transition probabilities closely. It
does however, underestimate the transitions from employment to unemployment particularly
for non-apprentices.
A re°ection of the overall good ¯t of the transitions above is the ¯t of the average experience
and tenure over time for the two education groups in Figure 10 plots. The model does a good
job in both dimension and even picks up the non linearity in the evolution of tenure for quali¯ed
apprentices. We also predict very well the average number of jobs held by both skill groups as
a function of potential experience (Figure 11).
Finally we are able to replicate almost perfectly the average pro¯le of wages for workers
since ¯rst entry on the labor market, including the apprenticeship period (see Figure 12).
In Figure 13 we show how the model ¯ts the standard deviation of wages over the lifecycle.
First note the pro¯le of the observed standard deviation is either declining with experience or
42Apprentices Non-Apprentices
Obs Pred Obs Pred
U to U 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87
U to E 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13
E to U 0.049 0.041 0.085 0.076
E to new E 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.036
E to same E 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.89
Table 14: Model ¯t - Transitions
remains °at after 3 years in the labor market. This is a remarkable contrast to U.S. data where
the variance is steadily increasing prompting a debate on whether wages have a unit root or
not. Here clearly they do not and this justi¯es our modelling where the shocks are not carried
from one ¯rm to another making them e®ectively transitory. While our model does not ¯t
perfectly this feature of the data it does pretty well in capturing the overall shape.
Figure 10: Observed and predicted experience and tenure pro¯les


















































































43Figure 11: Observed and ¯tted number of jobs

































































































E The Likelihood function
Conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, the model is Markovian. One can thus express the
individual likelihood as a product of conditional densities. The likelihood is written conditional
on business cycle Gt, the dynamics of which contributes multiplicatively to the sample likeli-
hood, and conditional on unobserved heterogeneity "i. Unobserved heterogeneity is eventually
be integrated out. The data consists in a series of wages and transitions across unemploy-
ment, and di®erent employment spells at various employers. Here we show how to compute the
likelihood of speci¯c transitions and accepted wages given the past.
² Transition from unemployment to work paid wit = w (observation) given Edi;Gt;Xit;wi(¡1);"i:









¹if + W (·) > ´it + U
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| {z }
That wage o®er is better than unemployment



















































































· = lnw ¡ ®0("i) ¡ ®EdEdi ¡ ®X(Xit;Edi) ¡ ®T(Tift;Edi) ¡ ®G(Edi)Gt:
That is:


















¾0 ´ ¾0 (Edi):
² Transition from unemployment to unemployment given Edi;Gt;Xit;wi(¡1);"i:











² Transition from work to unemployment given Edi;Gt;Xit;Tift;·ift¡1;"i:
LE¡U = ± |{z}
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unemployment is preferred to both competing jobs
45where ´it;·ift;¹ie f and ·0
ie f are random with
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where ©2 (¢;¢;½) denotes the cdf of two standardized normal variates with correlation ½.
² Transition from work to work in the same ¯rm paying now a wage wit = w given
Edi;Gt;Xit;Tift;·if;t¡1;"i:
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² Transition from work to work paid wit = w in the same ¯rm during appren-


























































² Transition from work to work paid wit = w in a new ¯rm given Edi, Gt, Xit, Tift,
·ift¡1, "i:
LE¡ e E (w) = (1 ¡ ±)¼W £ pdf
n
·0








· = lnw ¡ ®0("i) ¡ ®EdEdi ¡ ®X(Xit;Edi) ¡ ®T
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47² Transition from work to another work paid wit = w in a new ¯rm during
apprenticeship given Gt;Xit;Tift;·ift¡1;"i:
LA





























¡ ®0("i) ¡ ®X(Xit;NA) ¡ ®T(Tift = 0;NA) ¡ ®G(NA)Gt:
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· = lnw ¡ ®0("i) ¡ ®X(Xit = 0;NA) ¡ ®T(Tift = 0;NA) ¡ ®G(NA)Gt:
48² Sample likelihood. De¯ne PS(REGi;Y OBi;"i) as the probability of going through
the secondary or intermediate school (the vocational track, as opposed to high school
which leads to university) for individual i in region REGi and born in year Y OBi. Let
Zi = (REGi;Y OBi). We assume:
PS(Zi;"i) = ©(µZ (Zi) + µ" ("i))
where µZ (Zi) are region£cohort speci¯c e®ects. Now assume the distribution of un-
observed heterogeneity is discrete with J points of support denoted by hj each with
probability ¼j, where hj is a two dimensional vector. Given this the sample likelihood








PS(Zi;"i = hj)Lt0i(REGi;"i = hj)
¤Si £
1 ¡ PS(Zi;"i = hj)
¤1¡Sio
(E1)
where Lt0i(REGi;"i = j) is the likelihood of the sequence of observations for the ith
individual being 16 at time t0i in region i and born in year Y OBi and Si is an indicator
function, which is 1 when the individual has chosen vocational school (thus being in the
population to which our sample refers to) and zero otherwise.
E.1 Computing the Value Functions
We integrated out analytically as many state variables as possible (shocks to the value of leisure
(´), shocks to the cost of training !, and shocks to cost of moving ¹ ) as shown in the subsection
below. We approximate the value functions by evaluating them at a number of discrete points
in the state space and interpolating linearly in between. For experience and tenure the points
where we evaluate are 0, 2, 4, 6, 10 and 30 years of experience and 0, 2, 4, 6 and 30 years of
tenure; this level of detail turned out to be su±cient. The other state variable is the ¯rm-worker
match speci¯c e®ect which evolves as a random walk while the worker remains in the same job.
We use 6 points, on a grid which depends on education and on tenure to take into account
the non-stationary nature of the process. More speci¯cally, given the assumptions made, the
match e®ect is a normal variable with mean zero and variance T¾U(Ed)2 + ¾0(Ed)2 for an
individual with T years of tenure. We use a quadrature-based method as in the Tauchen and
Hussey (1991) procedure to generate a grid and transition matrices. We interpolate between
the points. The time horizon and the way we deal with the terminal condition is discussed in
the main text.
49E.1.1 Emax computations
Making use of the normality of innovations allows to simplify the Bellman equations signi¯-
cantly. For standardized normal random variables the following identity holds true (see Tallis
(1961)):












with ½ = Cov(U1;U2), and
PrfX1 > a;X2 > bg = Prf¡X1 < ¡a;¡X2 < ¡bg = ©2 (¡a;¡b;½):
² The deterministic value of unemployment: Conditional on Edi, Gt+1, Xit, wi(¡1),
"i, ·0
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It then remains to integrate Gt+1 and ·0
if out of U and W.
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And it remains to integrate Gt+1;uift+1;·0
ie f out of U, W, f W.
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